If they don't match, the data may have been tampered with since it was signed, or the signature may have been created with a private key that doesn't correspond to the public key presented by the signer.If the two hashes match, the recipient can be certain that the public key used to decrypt the digital signature corresponds to the private key used to create the digital signature.The keys are related mathematically, but the parameters are chosen so that calculating the private key from the public key is either impossible or prohibitively expensive Figure 1 shows a simplified view of the way a digital signature can be used to validate the integrity of signed data.Figure 1 shows two items transferred to the recipient of some signed data: the original data and the digital signature, which is basically a one-way hash (of the original data) that has been encrypted with the signer's private key.This section describes how public-key cryptography addresses the problem of tampering.
The source URIs (bucket or collection) on which signatures should be triggered and the destination where the data and the signatures will end-up.
In the case buckets URIs are specified, every collection in the source bucket will be reviewed/signed, review and destination will keep the same id.
The editors and reviewers groups are automatically created when the source collection is created.
A list of current W3C working drafts can be found at
The XML 1.0 Recommendation [XML] describes the syntax of a class of data objects called XML documents.
(Information about the hashing algorithm used is sent with the digital signature, although this isn't shown in the figure.) Finally, the receiving software compares the new hash against the original hash.